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1   Introduction 
Cosmology, and more particularly, quantum cosmology, has generated a number of 
different, often radically different viewpoints about both the beginning and the ending 
of the universe as well as a variety of possibilities with respect to cyclical theories of 
expansion and contraction. Despite the manifold differences between these theories, 
many of them, in particular, the theories expounded by Hawking (1999), Carroll and 
Chen (2004, 2005) and Peter Lynds (2003, 2006) often have more elements in 
common than those among which they differ.  In particular, the commonalities tend to 
cluster around the concepts of “weak singularity”, “no boundary condition”, and “the 
problem of specialness” with respect to scale, entropy and initial conditions.   
In the present paper we examine these concepts with particular attention to the 
nature and role of singularities relying in large part on two particular sources for our 
analysis. The first is the 1994 work of C.J.S. Clark on the analysis of space-time 
singularities, a work of general relativity largely exclusive of quantum mechanical 
effects and the second is a very recent paper by David J. Fernandez C. and Mercedes 
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Velazquez (2008) whose mathematics we employ to explore at a quantum mechanical 
level the turning points of cosmic expansion (i.e. maximal spaces with no further 
possible extensions) and the “big bang/big crunch” particularly in the context of the 
limitations imposed on the order of events suggested by Lynds (2006). 
1.1   The Mechanics of Contraction – The Standard Approach 
“Big Crunch” theories all depend on some sort of universal contraction although not 
nearly enough of these theories offer a plausible mechanism for why the universe 
should suddenly contract at a particular point. That is, "by what mechanism should the 
universe cease expanding, at which point gravity initiates an apparently unstoppable 
contraction?" The problem is sufficiently deep that for many years most physicists 
assumed a “steady state” model of the universe. In his treatment of incomplete 
geodesics and maximal spaces, C.J.S. Clarke offers at least one possibility in his 
treatment of the maximality assumption (p. 8): 
 
The foregoing result has shown that if M is inextendible then 
there is some timelike curve (actually a geodesic) - i.e. a possible 
worldline of a particle - which could continue in some extension of 
M but which in M itself simply stops. This seems unreasonable: 
why should M be cut short this way? It seems natural to demand 
that "if a space-time can continue then it will"; in other words, to 
demand that any reasonable space-time should not be inextendible.  
This is an assumption imposed upon space-time in addition to the 
field equations of Einstein. 
It can easily be shown that any space-time can in fact be 
extended until no further extension is possible. At this point the 
space-time is called maximal, and so we are lead to the idea that 
we need only consider maximal space-times.  But this idea is really 
not as innocuous as it might seem because of the problem that the 
extension of a space-time, when it exists, cannot usually be 
determined uniquely. In special cases there are unique extensions:  
an analytic space-time has (subject to some conditions) a unique 
maximal analytic extension; similarly, a global hyperbolic solution 
of the field equations (with a specified level of differentiability) is 
contained in a unique maximal solution. In both these cases a 
"principle of sufficient reason" demands that the maximal solution 
be taken. But suppose one has a non-analytic space-time where 
Einstein's field equations fail to predict a unique extension (either 
because there is a Cauchy horizon or because there is some sort of 
failure of the differentiability needed for the existence of unique 
solutions). Or suppose a situation arises in which there is a set of 
incomplete curves, each one of which can be extended in some 
extension of the space-time, but where there is no extension in 
which they can all be extended. (There exists admittedly artificial 
examples of this (Misner, 1967). In cases such as these, the same 
principle of sufficient reason would not allow one extension to 
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exist at the expense of another. Perhaps the space-time, like 
Buridan's ass between two bales of hay, unable to decide which 
way to go, brings the whole of history to a halt. 
2   The Quantum Mechanical Approach to Maximal States 
In at least one sense we must “jump the gun” a bit in order to discuss the quantum 
mechanical argument for the maximal extension of space-time never being achieved 
because this result is merely a byproduct of a quantum mechanical argument against 
the existence of strong singularity.  The gist of Fernandez and Velazques proof is that 
(8.0) “in identifying the appropriate displacement operator as well as an adequate 
‘extremal’ state for the Penning trap cavity…the corresponding Hamiltonian has 
neither a ground nor a top energy eigenvalue.  The proof of this claim, which we will 
return to in our discussion of singularities is as follows and is drawn directly from the 
previously reference paper by Fernandez and Velazquez.  In order to understand the 
proof, we must begin with their demonstration of the extremal state wave function: 
This existence of the extremal state |0,0,0ۄ is guaranteed by a theorem which is 
proven elsewhere [5]. It ensures that, if the operators 
         ܤ௝ ൌ ݅ ሬܲԦ  ڄ  ߙԦ    ൅ ሬܴԦ   ڄ  ߚ௝ ,    ܤ௝ற   ൌ  െ݅ߙԦ௝ற  ڄ  ሬܲԦ  ൅  ߚԦ௝  ற  ·   ሬܴԦ,   ݆ ൌ 1,2,3,           (1) 
Obey the commutation relations (17), then the system of partial differential equations 
ൻݎԦหܤ௝ห0,0,0ൿ 0, j = 1,2,3, for the extremal state wave function ߶଴ሺݎԦሻ ؠ  ۦݎԦ|0,0,0ۧ has a 
square integrable solution given by  
߶଴ሺݎԦሻ  ൌ ܿ exp ቀെ ଵଶ ܽ௜௝ई௜ई௝ቁ ൌ  ܿ exp ቀെ
ଵ
ଶ rԦ୘܉rԦቁ,                    (2) 
Where a = ൫ࣵ୧୨൯ is a complex symmetric matrix satisfying 
܉ߙԦ௝  ൌ  ߚԦ௝,   ݆ ൌ 1,2,3,                                        (3)  
According to (22), through equations (12.16) we identify the vectors 
ߙԦଵ  ൌ  ଵ ଶሺ௕మା ௩ሻభ/ర    ሺ1, െ݅, 0ሻ୘ , ߚଵ ൌ ሺܾଶ ൅  ݒሻଵ/ଶߙԦଵ , 
ߙԦଶ  ൌ  െ ଵ ଶሺ௕మା ௩ሻభ/ర    ሺ1, ݅, 0ሻ୘ , ߚଶ ൌ ሺܾଶ ൅  ݒሻଵ/ଶߙԦଶ,                    (4) 
ߙԦଷ  ൌ  െ ଵ √ଶሺିଶ௩ሻభ/ర    ሺ0, 0, 1ሻ୘ , ߚଷ ൌ ሺെ2ݒሻଵ/ଶߙԦଷ,                                       
Thus, a = diagቂඥܾଶ ൅  ݒ, ඥܾଶ ൅  ݒ, √െ2ݒ, ቃ, and from (23) we finally get the extremal 
state wave function we were looking for: 
߶଴ሺݎԦሻ  ൌ ܿ exp ൬െ ඥ௕
మା ௩
ଶ  ሺݔଶ ൅ ݕଶሻ െ ට
ି௩
ଶ ݖଶ൰.                      (5) 
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What is particularly interesting about this extremal state is that the Hamiltonian has 
neither a ground nor a top energy eigenvalue (p. 9) This is given a further exposition 
in the section on mean values of physical quantities. In particular, this calculation 
again demonstrates that the values of the extremal state as well as the CS wave 
function coincide with the previous calculation. Mathematically this is shown by the 
following exposition (pp. 7-8): 
Let us evaluate next the mean values ۃ ௝ܺۄ௭ ؠ  ൻݖห ௝ܺหݖൿ, ۃ ௝ܲۄ௭ ؠ  ൻݖห ௝ܲหݖൿ, ݆ ൌ 1,2,3, 
and the corresponding mean square deviations in a given CS|ݖۄ. To do that, we 
analyze first how the operators ௝ܺ , ௝ܺଶ , ௝ܲ , ௝ܲଶ are transformed under D(z). By using 
equation (35) it is straightforward to show that: 
ܦறሺݖሻ ௝ܺఎܦሺݖሻ ൌ ሺ ௝ܺ ൅ Γ௝ሻఎ.   ܦறሺݖሻ ௝ܲఎܦሺݖሻ ൌ ሺ ௝ܲ ൅ Σ௝ሻఎ, ߟ ൌ 1,2 ….           (6) 
Therefore: 
ۃ ௝ܺۄ௭ ൌ  ۃ ௝ܺۄ଴ ൅  Γ୨,  ۃX୨ଶۄ୸ ൌ   ۃX୨ଶۄ଴ ൅  2Γ୨ۃ ௝ܺۄ଴ ൅  Γ௝ଶ, ሺΔ ௝ܺሻ௭ଶ ൌ  ሺΔ ௝ܺሻ଴ଶ           (7) 
ۃ ௝ܲۄ௭ ൌ  ۃ ௝ܲۄ଴ ൅  Σ୨,  ۃP୨ଶۄ୸ ൌ   ۃP୨ଶۄ଴ ൅  2Σ୨ۃ ௝ܲۄ଴ ൅ Σ௝ଶ, ሺΔ ௝ܲሻ௭ଶ ൌ  ሺΔܲሻ଴ଶ             (8) 
Notice that the mean square deviations of  Xj and Pj are independent of z1, z2, z3 but 
depend on ۃ ௝ܺۄ଴, ۃ ௝ܲۄ଴, ۃ ௝ܺଶۄ଴, ۃ ௝ܲଶۄ଴, ݆ ൌ 1, 2, 3, which need to be evaluated. The first 
six quantities can be obtained from the homogeneous equations ۃܤ௞ۄ଴  ൌ
݅ሺߙԦԦ௞ሻ௝ۃ ௝ܲۄ଴ ൅ ሺߚԦ௞ሻ௝ۃ ௝ܺۄ଴ ൌ 0,  ۃܤ௞றۄ଴  ൌ െ݅ሺߙԦԦ௞כሻ௝ۃ ௝ܲۄ଴ ൅  ሺߚԦ௞כሻ௝ۃ ௝ܺۄ଴ ൌ 0, ݇ ൌ 1, 2, 3 
(see (22)) and use that ܤ௞|0,0,0ۄ ൌ ۃ0,0,0|ܤ௞ற ൌ 0.  By using (25), the system to be 
solved becomes:  
െ݅√െ2ݒ ۃܼۄ଴ ൅ ۃ ௭ܲۄ଴ ൌ 0 
√ܾଶ ൅  ݒሺۃܺۄ଴ െ  ݅ ଴ܻሻ ൅  ݅൫ۃ ௫ܲۄ଴ െ ݅ۃ ௬ܲۄ଴൯ ൌ  0, 
െ√ܾଶ ൅  ݒሺۃܺۄ଴ ൅  ݅ ଴ܻሻ െ  ݅൫ۃ ௫ܲۄ଴ ൅ ݅ۃ ௬ܲۄ଴൯ ൌ  0, 
and the complex conjugate equations. Its solution is given by 
ۃ ௝ܺۄ଴ ൌ  ۃ ௝ܲۄ଴ ൌ 0,         ݆ ൌ 1, 2, 3.                                   (41) 
In order to obtain ۃ ௝ܺଶۄ଴, ۃ ௝ܲଶۄ଴, we calculate the mean values for the several 
products of pairs involving ܤ௝, ܤ௞ற. From these thirty six equations just twenty one are 
linearly independent: ۃܤ௝ܤ௞ۄ଴ ൌ 0, ݆ ൌ 1, 2, 3, ݇ ൑ ݆ (six equations); ۃܤ௝றܤ௞றۄ଴ ൌ 0,
݆ ൌ 1, 2, 3, ݇ ൑ ݆ (six equations); ۃܤ௞றܤ௝ۄ଴ ൌ 0, ݆, ݇ ൌ 1, 2, 3, (nine equations).  By 
solving this linear system, the non-null results for the mean values of the twenty one 
independent products of Xi and Pj are now: 
ۃܺଶۄ଴ ൌ  ۃܻଶۄ଴ ൌ  ሾ4ሺܾଶ ൅  ݒሻሿି
భ
మ,            ۃܼଶۄ଴ ൌ  ሺെ8ݒሻି
భ
మ, 
ۃ ௫ܲଶۄ଴ ൌ  ۃ ௬ܲଶۄ଴ ൌ  ሾሺܾଶ ൅  ݒሻ/4ሿ
భ
మ,            ۃ ௭ܲଶۄ଴ ൌ  ሺെݒ/2ሻ
భ
మ, 
ۃܺ ௫ܲۄ଴ ൌ  ۃܻ ௬ܲۄ଴ ൌ  ۃܼ ௭ܲۄ଴ ൌ ݅/2. 
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The previous formulas imply that equations (39, 40) become 
ሺΔܺሻ௭ଶ ൌ  ሺΔYሻ௭ଶ ൌ  ሾ4ሺܾଶ ൅  ݒሻሿି
భ
మ,       ሺΔZሻ௭ଶ ൌ  ሺെ8ݒሻି
భ
మ, 
ሺΔP௫ሻ௭ଶ ൌ  ሺΔP௬ሻ௭ଶ ൌ ሾሺܾଶ ൅  ݒሻ/4ሿ
భ
మ,     ሺΔ ௭ܲሻ௭ଶ  ൌ ሺെݒ/2ሻ
భ
మ, 
and therefore 
ሺΔܺሻ௭ሺΔ ௫ܲሻ௭ ൌ ሺΔܻሻ௭൫Δ ௬ܲ൯௭ ൌ  ሺΔܼሻ௭ሺΔ ௭ܲሻ௭ ൌ 1/2. 
This means that our CS have minimum Heisenberg uncertainty relations. 
Finally, by using equations (15, 21) we calculate the mean value of the 
Hamiltonian H in a given CS |ݖۄ: 
ۃܪۄ௭ ൌ  ߱ଵ|ݖଵ|ଶ െ ߱ଶ|ݖଶ|ଶ ൅  ߱ଷ|ݖଷ|ଶ ൅  ܧ଴,଴,଴.                             (42) 
A similar calculation for (H2)z can be done, leading to: 
ሺΔܪሻ௭ଶ ൌ  ൫ܾ ൅  √ܾଶ ൅ ݒ൯
ଶ|ݖଵ|ଶ ൅ ൫ܾ െ  √ܾଶ ൅ ݒ൯
ଶ|ݖଶ|ଶ െ  2ݒ|ݖଷ|ଶ.    (43) 
Once again, the fact that H is not positive definite is clearly reflected in (42). 
Along this work we have assumed that ܾ ൌ െ ௘஻ଶ௖ ൐ 0. For ܾ ൏ 0, small 
differences concerning the identification of the appropriate annihilation and creation 
operators arise.  However, the extremal state and CS wave functions ߶଴ሺݎԦሻ, ߶௭ሺݎԦሻ as 
well as the corresponding mean values, will coincide with those previously calculated. 
In particular, the Heisenberg uncertainty relation will achieve once again its minimum 
value [14]. 
3   Singularity – Early Arguments 
One of the simplest arguments against strong singularity is simply that of a choice of 
improper metric.  In this case, an inappropriate choice of the Schwarzschild metric as 
a representation of strong or true singularity.  As Clarke explains: 
 
"In 1924 Eddington showed there was an isometry between the 
space-time M defined by the region r>2m in the Schwarzschild 
metric and part of a larger space-time M'.  Incomplete curves in M 
on which r -> 2m were mapped by this isometry into curves which 
were extensible in M': The singularity at 2m was no longer present.  
So if we identify the Schwarzschild space-time with the part of the 
Eddington space-time M' with which it is isometric, we see that it 
is not just incomplete in the formal sense defined above: it actually 
had a piece missing from it, a piece that is restored at M'. The 
singularity at r=2m is thus a mathematical artifact, a consequence 
of the fact that the procedure used to solve the field equations had 
fortuitously produced only a part of the complete space. 
We note that, despite this, there are still some authors who regard 
the Schwarzschild ‘singularity’ at r=2m as genuine; but this is only 
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justified if (as done by Rosen, 1974) one uses a non-standard 
physical theory in which there is some additional structure (such as 
a background metric) which itself becomes singular under the under 
the isometry of the metric into M', so that one structure, the metric, 
or the background is always singular at r = 2m. 
The situation in Schwarzschild clearly contrasts with that of the 
Friedmann metrics.  For these, on any of the incomplete curves the 
Ricci scalar tends to infinity.  For the smooth space-times that we 
are considering at the moment this is impossible on a curve which 
has an endpoint in space-time, and so there can in this case, be no 
isometric M' in which these curves have an endpoint.” 
 
Clarke’s subsequent arguments rest on the properties of extensibility and global 
hyperbolicity1 and ends up with various cosmic censorship models (both strong and 
weak forms) which either prevent the existence of strong singularities or which make 
them inaccessible to any particular observer in an inertial frame with bounded 
acceleration. Much of the distinction between these theories is a function of globally 
hyperbolic space-time and past-simplicity/past hyperbolicity such that for all timelike 
geodesics k in U0(s), J (k) < 2; also geodesics in U0(s) have no conjugate points  
(p. 127) From here he proceeds to eliminate what her refers to “primal singularities” 
and “dragging geodesics”. In this context, cosmic censorship provides a number of 
mechanisms for explaining why strong singularities are not accessible.  However, 
Peter Lynds offers a rather different approach, based on the second law of 
thermodynamics suggesting that the very nature of the big bang-big crunch makes any 
strong singularity inaccessible, even if it exists within the light cone and that this 
inaccessible history also explains the problems of scale and naturalness raised by 
Carroll and Chen (2004, 2005).  
4   Time 
In 2003, Peter Lynds published a controversial paper, “Time and Classical and 
Quantum Mechanics: Indeterminacy vs. Discontinuity” in Foundations of Physics 
Letters. Lynds’ theory does away with the notion of “instants” of time , relegates the 
“flow of time” to the psychological domain. While we have commented elsewhere on 
the implications of Lynds’ theory for mathematical modeling it might save a bit of 
time simply to borrow Wikipedia’s summary of this paper: 
 
Lynds' work involves the subject of time. The main conclusion 
of his paper is that there is a necessary trade off of all precise 
                                                          
1
 For every pair of points, p,q є U,I-(p)∩I+(q)is compact.  Here I±  is the future(past of a 
set S in space-time. “Causality” holds on U (no closed timelike curves exist). Classically, a 
more restrictive and technical assumption is required, namely, “strong causality” – that no 
“almost closed” timelike curves exist, but the recent work of Hawking and Penrose (1996) 
shows that causality suffices.  Global hyperbolicity implies that there is a family of Cauchy 
surfaces for U.  Essentially, it means that everything that happens on U is determined by the 
equations of motion, together with initial data specified on a surface. (Wikipedia). 
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physical magnitudes at a time, for their continuity over time. More 
specifically, that there is not an instant in time underlying an 
object's motion, and as its position is constantly changing over 
time, and as such, never determined, it also does not have a 
determined relative position. Lynds posits that this is also the 
correct resolution of Zeno's paradoxes, with the paradoxes arising 
because people have wrongly assumed that an object in motion has 
a determined relative position at any given instant in time, thus 
rendering the body's motion static and frozen at that instant and 
enabling the impossible situation of the paradoxes to be derived. A 
further implication of this conclusion is that if there is no such 
thing as determined relative position, velocity, acceleration, 
momentum, mass, energy and all other physical magnitudes, 
cannot be precisely determined at any time either. Other 
implications of Lynds' work are that time does not flow, that in 
relation to indeterminacy in precise physical magnitude, the micro 
and macroscopic are inextricably linked and both a part of the 
same parcel, rather than just a case of the former underlying and 
contributing to the latter, that Chronons, proposed atoms of time, 
cannot exist, that it does not appear necessary for time to emerge 
or congeal from the big bang, and that Stephen Hawking's theory 
of Imaginary time would appear to be meaningless, as it is the 
relative order of events that is relevant, not the direction of time 
itself, because time does not go in any direction. Consequently, it 
is meaningless for the order of a sequence of events to be 
imaginary, or at right angles, relative to another order of events. 
 
One can see from the above summary that this radical reformulation of the concept 
of time is bound to have significant cosmological implications.  We discussed some 
of these implications in a brief paper in 2004, “Time and Classical and Quantum 
Mechanics and the Arrow of Time”.2 We began with a discussion of John Gribbin’s 
analysis, “Quantum Time Waits for No Cosmos”, and Gribbin’s argument against the 
mechanics of time reversibility as an explanation for the origin of the universe, where 
he cites Raymond LaFlamme:3 
 
The intriguing notion that time might run backwards when the 
Universe collapses has run into difficulties. Raymond LaFlamme, 
of the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, has 
carried out a new calculation which suggests that the Universe 
cannot start out uniform, go through a cycle of expansion and 
collapse, and end up in a uniform state. It could start out 
disordered, expand, and then collapse back into disorder. But, 
since the COBE data show that our Universe was born in a 
                                                          
2
 “Time and Classical and Quantum Mechanics and the Arrow of Time”, paper presented at the 
annual meeting of the North American Association for Computation in the Social and 
Organizational Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University, June, 2004. 
3
 http://www.lifesci.sussex.ac.uk/home/John_Gribbin/timetrav.htm\ 
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smooth and uniform state, this symmetric possibility cannot be 
applied to the real Universe. 
 
The concept of time reversibility, while apparently quite straightforward in many 
cases, seems never to be without considerable difficulty in cosmology, and indeed, 
explaining the mechanics of time reversibility and its relationship to Einstein’s 
cosmological constant is one of the major enterprises of quantum cosmology (Sorkin, 
2007).  The terns of the debate expressed by Gribbin above, have been extended by 
Wald (2005) who acknowledges Carroll and Chen’s work, discussed earlier in this 
paper, but who argues that at some point an anthropic principle introduces a 
circularity into the causal logic.  Sorkin covers much of the distance needed for a 
Carroll-Chen type counterargument in his 2007 paper, “Is the cosmological 
“constant” a nonlocal quantum residue of discreteness of the causal set type?”, 
however a complete discussion of Sorkin’s model is beyond the scope of our present 
exploration.4  
4.1   The Arrow of Time 
One set of problems with the thermodynamic arrow of time for the very early 
universe (and this is partially addressed by Sorkin) is that in addition to the problem 
of possible inhomogeneities in the early universe there is still a lack of consensus or 
unequivocal evidence on the invariance of fundamental physical constants during the 
early history of the universe.  Various authors have recently suggested that the speed 
of light may have been greater during the earliest period of the universe’s formation 
(Murphy, Webb and Flambaum, 2002). 
In our 2004 review of Lynds work on how we might better understand the 
thermodynamic arrow of time we also raised two moderately troubling complexity 
issues which at present remain largely unanswered. The first is the problem of 
heteroskedastic time behavior in the early universe.  This question is not unconnected 
to the question of changes in the values of fundamental physical constants in the early 
universe. In most models of early universe formation a smooth or linear flow of time is 
                                                          
4
 In his conclusion, Sorkin argues “Heuristic reasoning rooted in the basic hypotheses of causal 
set theory predicted Λ ∼ ±1/√V , in agreement with current data. But a fuller understanding of 
this prediction awaits the “new QCD” (“quantum causet dynamics”). Meanwhile, a reasonably 
coherent phenomenological model exists, based on simple general arguments. It is broadly 
consistent with observations but a fuller comparison is needed. It solves the “why now” 
problem: Λ is “ever-present”. It predicts further that pΛ ≠ − pΛ (ш ≠ −1) and that Λ has 
probably changed its sign many times in the past.  The model contains a single free parameter 
of order unity that must be neither too big nor too small. In principle the value of this 
parameter is calculable, but for now it can only be set by hand.  In this connection, it’s 
intriguing that there exists an analog condensed matter system the “fluid membrane”, whose 
analogous parameter is not only calculable in principle from known physics, but might also be 
measurable in the laboratory!  That our model so far presupposes spatial homogeneity and 
isotropy is no doubt its weakest feature. Indeed, the ansatz on which it is based strongly 
suggests a generalization such that Λ -fluctuations in “causally disconnected” regions would 
be independent of each other; and in such a generalization, spatial inhomogeneities would 
inevitably arise. 
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assumed. However, it is possible to imagine inflationary models where the expansion 
of time dimension or the time-like dimensions of a higher order manifold inflate in a 
heteroskedastic fashion. To the extent that the thermodynamic arrow of time is invoked 
as an element of cosmological explanation,   It would need to be able to explain the 
dynamical evolution of the universe, not just as we know it today, but at those 
particularly difficult to characterize beginning and end points of the system.  The 
difficulty with heteroskedastic time distributions is that they may or may not allow 
recovery of the standard Boltzmann expression. At a deeper level, it is likely that in 
characterizing the development of the early universe, one may have to incorporate a 
significant number of non-commuting quantum operators. Further, in this context, our 
knowledge of the early universe is both substantively incomplete, because we lack any 
system of measurement for the first three hundred thousand years of time evolution of 
the system (i.e. the period prior to the decoupling of baryons and photons) and very 
likely theoretically incomplete as well. We can compare the problem to one of discrete 
time series evolutions with low dimensionality and discrete combinatorics. For 
example, the random order of a shuffled deck of cards can eventually be repeated 
because the dimensionality of the system is low. As dynamical systems take on higher 
orders of dimensionality their asymptotes become ill-defined (in at least one sense, this 
is the objection raised by Gribbin and LaFlamme).5 
Another problem is what Freeman Dyson characterizes as the struggle between 
order and entropy in the big crunch. As the universe approaches infinity and the 
average density approaches zero, temperature does not approach zero, and thus the 
nature of the struggle between order and entropy may actually be characterized by 
very different time evolutions that those with which we are familiar. In addition, there 
is the “Maxwell’s Demon” family of arguments. This is a systems dynamic which is 
particularly relevant to complexity science. The problem here is that there may be 
emergent phenomena at the end of the life of the universe which causes the system’s 
time evolution to then behave in unexpected ways.  In some sense this is logical trap 
lurking behind statistical reasoning. Under normal conditions, the descriptive and 
inferential statistical conjecture that the near future will look like the recent past (or 
more boldly that fundamental physical constants are perfect invariants) is entirely 
reasonable. However, in the face of emergent phenomena, this assumption may not 
hold.  Indeed, this problem is at the center of much of the debate over “relic” radiation 
and arguments over the age of the universe. 
Yet another problem, which may also encompass emergent behavior, has to do 
with symmetry breaking. The universe has undergone several phase transitions by 
symmetry breaking. As a result, additional forces have emerged at each of these 
transitions. First gravity separated out of other forces, and it is for that reason that we 
can expect gravity wave detectors to probe more deeply into the early history of the 
universe than any other technology. To return to the emergent properties argument, 
we cannot definitively rule out (by means of present theory and observations) the 
possibility that at some future time (presumably near the end of the system’s time 
                                                          
5
 A substantial amount of work on non-extensive statistical mechanics has been done by 
Tsallis, et al. most recently (2007) “Nonergodicity and Central Limit Behavior for Long-
range Hamiltonians” http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/0706/0706.4021v3.pdf  
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evolution) that some fifth force will separate out from the known four forces.6  At the 
classical level, time reversibility and a thermodynamic arrow of time is no longer 
problematical, but at the quantum level, and at the cosmological level, the concept 
remains murky at best. 
5   Lynds’ Conjecture 
Peter Lynds has developed an alternative cosmology, or an alternative foundation for 
cosmology which flows in part from his treatment of time. He introduces his approach 
by stating:7 
 
Based on the conjecture that rather than the second law of 
thermodynamics inevitably be breached as matter approaches a big 
crunch or a black hole singularity, the order of events should 
reverse, a model of the universe that resolves a number of 
longstanding problems and paradoxes in cosmology is presented. A 
universe that has no beginning (and no need for one), no ending, but 
yet is finite, is without singularities, precludes time travel, in which 
events are neither determined by initial or final conditions, and 
problems such as why the universe has a low entropy past, or 
conditions at the big bang appear to be so special, require no causal 
explanation, is the result. This model also has some profound 
philosophical implications. 
 
The model arises in part as a consequence of Lynds’ unique treatment of time, and 
his ability to present a scientific framework which dispenses with the conventional 
notion of “instants” and a concomitant “flow” of these instants of time. He develops 
his cosmology based on the conjecture that in a “big crunch”, at precisely the moment 
where the second law of thermodynamics would necessarily be breached in order to 
preserve symmetrical event structure, and just before the universe reaches a 
singularity, instead of breaching the second law of thermodynamics, the order of 
events would be reversed and universal expansion would begin without a singularity 
actually having been reached.  In Lynds words:8 
 
The natural question then became, what would happen if the 
second law of thermodynamics were breached? People such as 
Hawking (1996, 1999) and Gold had assumed that all physical 
processes would go into reverse. In other words, they had assumed 
                                                          
6
 Admittedly, this is a significant part of the epistemological argument put forth by Carroll and 
Carroll and Chen in the “natural” universe conjecture.  Implicit in their theory is the idea that 
if cosmos formation is a “natural” phenomena, rather than the “unnatural” situation suggested 
by the differences in scale values for fundamental constants, then an additional, emergent 
force would be “unnatural”. 
7
 Lynds, P. (2006) “On a finite universe with no beginning or end”, http://arxiv.org/ftp/physics/ 
papers/0612/0612053.pdf 
8
 Ibid. 
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that events would take place in the direction in which entropy was 
decreasing, rather than increasing as we observe today. Furthermore, 
they had assumed that entropy would decrease in the direction in 
which the universe contracted towards a big crunch (in their case, 
towards what we call the big bang). But if the second law correctly 
holds, on a large scale, entropy should still always increase. Indeed, 
what marks it out so much from the other laws of physics in the first 
place, is that it is asymmetric – it is not reversible. If all of the laws 
of physics, with the exception of the second law of thermodynamics, 
are time symmetric and can equally be reversed, it became apparent 
that if faced with a situation where entropy might be forced to 
decrease rather than increase, rather than actually doing so, the order 
of events should simply reverse, so that the order in which they took 
place would still be in the direction in which entropy was increasing. 
The second law would continue to hold, events would remain 
continuous, and no other law of physics would be contravened. 
 
Hence, in Lynds’ model, any events which would have taken place in a situation 
where entropy was decreasing would experience a reversal of the time ordering of 
events, and in the subsequent expansion of the universe, “events would immediately 
take up at where the big crunch singularity would have been had events not reversed, 
and in this direction, no singularity would be encountered. The universe would then 
expand from where the big crunch singularity would have been had events not 
reversed (i.e. the big crunch reversed), and with events going in this direction, entropy 
would still be increasing, no singularity would be encountered, and no laws of physics 
would be contravened. They would all still hold.” (p. 6) 
Lynds’ argument necessarily bounds this reversal in the ordering of events to a 
very small region, and quite shortly thereafter, normal processes of inflation, 
including increasing entropy resume. Both the physical and the philosophical 
implications of this position are profound.  On the philosophical side, Lynds has 
introduced a new concept, not only of the ultimate origin of the universe, but also a 
complex redefinition of “past” and “future”: 
 
At this point, it becomes apparent that this would not only lead 
things back to the big bang, but it would actually cause it. The 
universe would then expand, cool, and eventually our solar system 
would take shape. It would also mean that this would be the exact 
repeat of the universe we live in now. Something further becomes 
evident, however, and it is perhaps the most important (and will 
probably be the most misunderstood and puzzled over) feature of this 
model. If one asks the question, what caused the big bang? The answer 
here is the big crunch. This is strange enough. But is the big crunch in 
the past or the future of the big bang? It could equally be said to be 
either. Likewise, is the big bang in the past or future of the big crunch? 
Again, it could equally be said to be either. The differentiation 
between past and future becomes completely meaningless. Moreover, 
one is now faced with a universe that has neither a beginning nor end 
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in time, but yet is also finite and needs no beginning. The finite vs. 
infinite paradox of Kant completely disappears. 
Although if viewed from our normal conception of past and 
future (where we make a differentiation), the universe would repeat 
over and over an infinite number of times, and could also be said to 
have done so in the past. Crucially, however, if one thinks about 
what is actually happening in respect to time, no universe is in the 
future or past of another one. It is exactly the same version, once, 
and it is non-cyclic. If so desired, one might also picture the 
situation as an infinite number of the same universe repeating at 
exactly the same time. But again, if properly taking into account 
what is happening in respect to time, in actuality, there is no infinite 
number of universes. It is one and the same. 
 
As previously indicated, this conjecture represents another radical and novel 
interpretation of time. However, one of the most interesting features of Lynds’ 
conjecture is that it actually meets the two primary criteria of Hawking’s M-Theory, 
(a) weak singularity (in Lynds’ case the singularity is there, but it is, in some sense, 
outside the light cone and outside the observable event horizon) and (b) no boundary 
condition (albeit, not in the precise fashion that Hawking interprets the no boundary 
condition restriction).9 Admittedly, the model is in some ways profoundly counter-
intuitive, but that is largely because in a very curious way, even when treating 
subjects in both relativity and quantum mechanics, we have a tendency to either 
overtly or covertly introduce Newtonian notions of time.  Some of this is addressed in 
Smolin’s critiques of general relativity and quantum mechanics.10  Lynds himself 
addresses a potential source of difficulty in the section of his article entitled “Potential 
Criticisms”: (p.9) 
                                                          
9
 It is important to note that when the clock restarts at the big bang, the universe is not in the 
future or past of another one. In a sense, it is time itself that restarts (although, again, nothing 
in fact actually “restarts”), so there is no past or future universe. Because of this, no 
conservation laws are violated. It is also important to note that it is simply just the order of 
events that reverse - something that would be immediate. Time does not begin “flowing” 
backwards to the big bang, nor does anything travel into the future or past of anything, 
including time and some imagined “present moment”. Indeed, this model contains another 
interesting consequence. As there is no differentiation between past and future in it, and, 
strictly speaking, no event could ever be said to be in the future or past of another one, it 
would appear to provide a clear reason as to why time travel is not possible. In relation to 
future and past, there is clearly nothing there to travel into. Physically speaking, the same can 
be said for travel through an interval of time, a flow of it, as well as space-time. (p. 8) 
10
 In “Three Roads to Quantum Gravity”, Smolin argues that the fundamental flaw in relativity 
is that it fails to incorporate the effect of the observer on observed phenomena and that 
quantum mechanics, while achieving the former has a tendency to treat quantum-mechanical 
events as occurring in traditional, Newtonian spacetime. He then argues that  the unification 
of the partial completeness of these two new physical paradigms will be required to develop 
an adequate theory of quantum gravity.  A quantum cosmology is likewise implicit in such a 
unification.  Lynds provides some interesting clues to this unification insofar as puts time on 
all scales on a firm Einsteinian footing.  In fact, one might answer Smolin’s provocative 
essay title “Where are the Einsteinians?” with the retort “In New Zealand”. 
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An obvious criticism for the model seems to raise itself. It 
implies that the universe can somehow anticipate future or past 
events in exact detail, and then play them over at will. At first 
glance, this just seems too far-fetched. How could it possibly know? 
With a little more thought, however, one recognizes that such a 
contention would assume that there actually was a differentiation 
between past and future events in the universe. With this model, it is 
clear there would not be.  Events could neither be said to be in the 
future or past of one another; they would just be. Moreover, as there 
is nothing to make one time (as indicated by a clock) any more 
special than another, there is no present moment gradually 
unfolding; all different events and times share equal reality (in 
respect to time, none except for the interval used as the reference). 
Although physical continuity (i.e. the capability for events to be 
continuous), and as such, the capability for motion and of clocks 
and rulers to represent intervals, would stop them from all 
happening at once (and to happen at all), all events and times in the 
universe would already be mapped out. As such, as long as it still 
obeyed all of its own physical laws, the universe would be free and 
able to play any order of events it wished. Please note that this 
timeless picture of reality is actually the same as that provided by 
relativity and the “block” universe model, the formalized view of 
space-time resulting from the lack of a “preferred” present moment 
in Einstein’s relativity theories, in which all times and events in the 
universe – past, present and future – are all mapped out together, 
fixed, and share equal status. 
 
Lynds model contains a number of additional features, including some novel 
treatments of Kaon decay, black holes and “white holes”, all of which are successfully 
incorporated in his model.  While it is beyond the scope of the present paper to discuss 
these details, they deserve mention as indicators of the level of sophistication in what 
some might initially imagine to be a naïve interpretation of quantum cosmology. 
6   Conclusion 
In the foregoing paper we have examined a number of cosmological dynamics, 
particularly in light of the recent theories of time and cosmology put forward by Peter 
Lynds.  Further, we have noted how the connection between the necessary conditions 
of extendibility and incompleteness with respect to Einstein’s field equations leads 
under a variety of conditions to “unobservable singularity”.  The novelty of Lynds’ 
solution is that it suggests that while the primordial singularity, including the 
problematic initial conditions of “specialness” explained by Carroll and Chen, exists 
within the light cone, it is nonetheless an inaccessible geodesic. Further, Lynds 
argument offers the novelty of a closed causal loop between the Big Bang and Big 
Crunch, no longer requiring an explanation for the special or natural entropic and 
scale conditions of the observable universe. 
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